Philip Fisher's 1958 book Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits laid out 15 points for identifying exceptional growth companies — and while Fisher himself relied on qualitative research ("scuttlebutt": talking to customers, competitors, and former employees), most of his points map directly onto filterable fundamental criteria available in a modern screener. Fisher's influence runs deep in growth investing — Warren Buffett has credited him alongside Benjamin Graham as foundational to his own approach — making his checklist a useful, still-relevant lens for screening European growth and quality names today.
Last updated: July 2026.
Who was Philip Fisher, and why his checklist still matters
Philip Fisher managed money from the 1930s through the late 20th century and is considered one of the founding figures of growth investing as a discipline distinct from Graham's deep-value approach. Where Graham focused on buying assets below intrinsic value, Fisher focused on identifying exceptional businesses worth holding for the long term, almost regardless of near-term valuation — a philosophy Buffett has described as roughly 15% Graham (valuation discipline) and 85% Fisher (business quality) in his own later evolution.
Fisher's 15 points, from Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, were originally meant to be answered through direct research — talking to a company's customers, suppliers, and competitors. Several of them, however, have reasonable fundamental proxies that a screener can approximate.
The 15 points, translated into screening criteria
Points with direct fundamental proxies
1. Does the company have products with sufficient market potential for a sizeable increase in sales for several years? Proxy: multi-year revenue growth CAGR, sustained rather than a single strong year.
2. Does management have a determination to continue developing products that will further increase total sales potential? Proxy: R&D spend as a percentage of revenue, and its trend over time — increasing R&D intensity alongside sustained revenue growth is a reasonable fundamental signal of this intent.
3. How effective is the company's R&D in relation to its size? Proxy: revenue growth relative to R&D spend — a rough efficiency ratio, best compared within a sector rather than across sectors with very different R&D intensity norms.
4. Does the company have an above-average sales organisation? Weakly proxied by: operating margin trend relative to sales & marketing spend intensity, where disclosed — an efficient go-to-market shows up as controlled opex growth alongside strong revenue growth.
5. Does the company have a worthwhile profit margin? Direct: gross margin and operating margin, benchmarked against sector norms.
8. Does the company have outstanding labour and personnel relations? Weakly proxied by: employee count growth relative to revenue growth (efficient hiring without visible strain), though this is one of the harder points to approximate with pure fundamentals.
11. Does the company have a short-range or long-range outlook in regard to profits? Proxied by: R&D and capex intensity relative to near-term margin — a company sacrificing near-term margin for R&D/capex investment is signalling a longer-range orientation, though this requires judgement, not just a threshold.
12. Will the company's growth require significant equity financing that dilutes existing shareholders' benefit from the anticipated growth? Direct: shares outstanding trend — a growing share count while revenue grows is a dilution signal a screener can flag directly (see EPS growth screening for why this matters relative to headline growth figures).
13. Does management talk freely to investors about its affairs when things are going well, but "clam up" when troubles occur? Not fundamentally proxyable — requires reading actual management communication and disclosure history over time.
14. Does the company have a management of unquestionable integrity? Weakly proxied by: insider ownership and insider buying activity — management with meaningful skin in the game and a history of buying, not just selling, is a reasonable (though imperfect) integrity proxy.
Points that remain genuinely qualitative
Several of Fisher's points resist fundamental proxying entirely and require the kind of direct research ("scuttlebutt") Fisher himself relied on:
- Does the company have a management team of depth? (succession planning, bench strength)
- Does the company have outstanding cost analysis and accounting controls? (internal process quality)
- Are there other facets of the business, somewhat peculiar to the industry, that will give important clues as to how outstanding the company may be in relation to its competition? (industry-specific competitive dynamics)
- Does the company have a management with unquestionable integrity? (partially proxyable, as above, but ultimately a judgement call)
These points are a genuine reminder that no screener — however deep its filter set — replaces direct qualitative research on a shortlisted candidate. A screen built from the proxies above is a way to generate a shortlist worth that deeper research, not a substitute for it.
Building a Fisher-inspired screen
Core Fisher-proxy growth screen:
| Filter | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue growth (3yr CAGR) | > 10% (sustained, point 1) |
| Gross margin | > 40% (point 5, sector-adjusted) |
| Operating margin | Stable or expanding (points 4/11) |
| Shares outstanding trend | Flat or declining (point 12 — no meaningful dilution) |
| Insider ownership | > 10% (point 14 proxy) |
| Sort by | Revenue growth descending |
Higher-conviction variant (adding insider conviction as corroboration):
| Filter | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue growth (3yr CAGR) | > 12% |
| Operating margin | Expanding YoY |
| Insider net buy value (90d) | > €0 |
| Shares outstanding trend | Flat or declining |
| Sort by | Insider net buy value descending |